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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We
conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and
individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contri-
butions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential
uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as in-
dividual characteristics like risk and ambiguity attitudes, giving type, and demographics
(individual level). We find that consequential uncertainty tends to reduce overall contribu-
tions, but not the cost-effectiveness of those contributions. Meanwhile, cost-effectiveness
varies by giving type—which is a novel result that is consistent with hypotheses we gen-
erate from theory—but other individual characteristics have little influence on contribu-
tions or cost-effectiveness. Our work has important positive and normative implications
for charitable giving and public good provision in the real world, and it is particularly
germane to emerging online crowdfunding and patronage platforms that confront users
with a multitude of competing opportunities for giving.
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1 Introduction
Individuals engage with myriad public goods in their daily lives, ranging from environmental
quality to human services to public spaces and public art, and they may contribute to these
various causes through monetary donations, in-kind gifts, and volunteerism. This diverse
landscape presents private citizens with a rich choice set for public good contributions, but it
also creates challenges for coordination and cost-effective allocation of resources. Given vast
heterogeneity in public goods and technologies for augmenting public goods, there is latitude
for misallocation of resources across causes (Chan and Wolk, 2020). These issues have become
even more pronounced in recent times, as online crowdfunding and patronage platforms offer
a growing menu of public good possibilities to a rapidly expanding base of contributors.
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of cost-(in)effective contributions to public
goods, exploring factors at both the institutional and individual levels. At the institutional
level, we examine whether patterns of giving are influenced by consequential uncertainty over
the value of public good contributions. At the individual level, we consider risk and ambiguity
attitudes, giving type as elicited through a charitable giving task, and common demographic
covariates. To understand these relationships, we model behavior in a public good game that
accounts for heterogeneity in giving types and social preferences. We derive from this model
testable predictions that flow transparently from microfoundations, and we proceed to test
these hypotheses in a pre-registered online experiment.
Our experimental design builds on that of Chan and Wolk (2020), which features a set
of four simultaneous public good contribution decisions with different marginal per capita
returns (MPCRs). Importantly, this multiple public good environment makes possible cost-
ineffective contributions, as subjects may contribute at low MPCRs without exhausting all
contribution possibilities at high MPCRs. We extend this framework to examine how individ-
ual and institutional factors affect contribution amounts and the cost-effectiveness of those
contributions. In particular, we construct two treatments in which the MPCR of each public
good is a random variable with known bounds. Importantly, bounds are non-overlapping
across the four public goods, allowing us to construct a clean and novel measure of cost-
ineffectiveness to test our hypotheses. In one treatment, the distributions for these random
variables are known (Risky treatment), while in another treatment the distributions are un-
known (Ambiguity treatment); we compare these treatments to each other and to a control
treatment in which MPCRs are certain (Certain treatment). We also include an array of
additional tasks to elicit individual characteristics, allowing us to investigate the relationship
between cost-ineffectiveness and demographics, risk and ambiguity attitudes, risk literacy,
giving types, and attentiveness.
We conduct a series of parametric and non-parametric tests to compare contribution be-
havior across treatments and across individuals. First, focusing on contribution levels, we find
that individual characteristics have little predictive power for individual contributions. How-
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ever, we do see differences in contributions across treatments, indicating that consequential
uncertainty may influence overall giving behavior. In particular, we see that total contribu-
tions are lower in Risky relative to Certain, which suggests that the presence of risk may
dampen overall giving. Total contributions in Ambiguity are between these two extremes and
are not statistically distinguishable from either.
Turning to our measure of cost-ineffectiveness, we find that (the nature of) uncertainty has
no detectable impact on the cost-effectiveness of contributions. Likewise, cost-effectiveness
does not vary with the vast majority of individual characteristics that we elicited, including
demographics, risk and ambiguity attitudes, risk literacy, and attentiveness. However, we
do find interesting differences in cost-effectiveness across our four giving types, as classified
through subjects’ actions in a separate charitable giving task: non-donors, pure warm-glow
givers, pure altruists, and impure altruists. Here, we find that non-givers contribute in a
more cost-effective manner than pure warm-glow givers and impure altruists. Individuals
with warm-glow motives are most inclined to contribute in a cost-ineffective manner, and
these effects are especially pronounced in the Ambiguity environment. These findings are
robust for within- and between-subjects analyses, and they are also robust to alternative
classifications rules for giving type.
Our experimental results provide important insights for the broader world. Individuals
have always had many avenues for augmenting public goods, e.g., when facing multiple chari-
table causes. These choice sets continue to expand with modern crowdfunding and patronage
platforms, making room for inefficient allocation of resources across public goods. Inefficiency
may arise from individual or institutional factors, and understanding the influence of these
different factors is crucial to improving public good provision. In many cases, there may
be uncertainty about the productivity of different public good investments. For example,
how well do investments in civic crowdfunding projects (e.g., urban greenspaces, public art
installations, etc.) enhance social cohesion? How well do individual actions (e.g., wearing
face masks, minimizing social contact) help blunt the spread of infectious diseases? Our ex-
perimental results shed light on such settings, revealing that uncertainty in productivity of
public good investments affects overall contribution levels, but not the cost-effectiveness of
allocations across technologies.
There are also important questions about how public good contributions differ along di-
mensions of individual heterogeneity. What types of individuals are most generous in public
good provision, and which are most likely to contribute in cost-(in)effective ways? We find
that, by and large, individual characteristics have little bearing on contribution levels. How-
ever, an individual’s giving type—i.e., whether they are a non-giver, warm-glow giver, pure
altruist, or impure altruist—does influence the efficacy of contributions. This finding ac-
cords with predictions from theory, although we are the first, to our knowledge, to document
this empirically. Overall, our work provides novel and timely insights into both positive and
normative aspects of public good provision.
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Our work advances several distinct lines of inquiry in the economics of public good provi-
sion and charitable giving.
In focusing on efficiency, our work ties in with discussions spurred by the Effective Altru-
ism movement. Effective Altruists urge donors to give to charities that generate the greatest
benefit per dollar donated. This idea has been a topic of substantial interest among philoso-
phers and ethicists (Singer, 2015; MacAskill, 2016), but it also has natural intersections with
efficiency and cost-effectiveness concerns long articulated by economists (List, 2011; Karlan
and Wood, 2017). These principles have also gained traction outside of academia, e.g., in the
form of organizations like Charity Navigator and GiveWell, which seek to quantify the social
impact of dollars donated across charities and causes.
Yet, in spite of clear economic and ethical rationales for effective altruism, many indi-
viduals still appear unresponsive or inattentive to the effectiveness of their charitable efforts.
Evidence from laboratory and field experiments shows that most donors do not increase their
donations when provided with information about the effectiveness of the charity (Clark et al.,
2018; Karlan and Wood, 2017). Metzger and Günther (2019) show that many participants
in laboratory experiments are unwilling to purchase, even for a minimal fee, information on
the efficiency of the charity they have been asked to donate to.1 Instead, these participants
show greater interest in purchasing information about the people that the charity will help,
suggesting that efficiency is not a top priority. Along similar lines, Berman et al. (2018) report
that, for most participants, emotional attachment to a charitable cause is more important
than the effectiveness of the charity, which may explain why few people behave as effective
altruists. Genç et al. (2020) show via a choice experiment that most donors place significantly
greater weight on where a donation is spent (preferring it to be spent closer to home), while
assigning less importance to the effectiveness of the donation or the needs of the recipient. In
short, there is robust evidence that many donors show little interest in the efficiency of the
charities to which they are donating.
We explore how this (in)attention to cost-effectiveness may relate to institutional and
individual factors. Our investigation into individual characteristics contributes to a broader
literature on how contribution behaviors differ across motivations for giving. An influential
body of theory within economics separates motives for giving into two main types: pure al-
truists and warm-glow givers (Warr, 1982; Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002;
Yildirim, 2014). Pure altruists derive utility from the total amount of the charitable good pro-
vided. To a pure altruist, her donation and the donations of others are perfect substitutes,
leading to crowding out of charitable donations (Warr, 1982). In contrast, a warm-glow
giver derives utility from the act of giving itself, thus removing the scope for crowding out
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990). A third category, impure altruists, comprises individuals who earn
1Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) report a similar finding in the context of a public good game: when
there is an unknown probability that the private account and/or public account will not be paid out, most
participants choose not to pay a small fee to find out what this unknown probability is.
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utility both from own donations and total donations. It is often assumed that warm-glow
givers are more prone to inefficient donations than pure altruists (Singer, 2015), a result that
follows clearly from theory. However, to our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence
supporting this claim. For example, Null (2011) separates donors into different types by
assuming those who donate inefficiently must be warm-glow givers (after ruling out risk aver-
sion). Similarly, Karlan and Wood (2017) report that some participants increase donations
when presented with information on the effectiveness of donations, but many participants do
not. They posit that the latter group may include warm-glow givers, but their experimental
design does not allow them to ascertain this. Against this backdrop, our work provides an
important contribution by demonstrating a direct link between giving type and cost-effective
public good provision.
Individuals have a wide array of opportunities to contribute to public goods and charitable
causes, so an implicit concern raised in all of the aforementioned studies is that donors may
misallocate their resources toward less worthy causes. A number of recent studies have tackled
this issue of multiple public goods directly. Much of the work in this realm focuses on
coordination of donors across public goods. Corazzini et al. (2015) show that coordination
problems can be eliminated by making one public good focal by offering better payoffs. Earlier
work by Cherry and Dickinson (2008) similarly finds that subjects successfully coordinate on
the option with highest social returns when faced with multiple public goods, even when the
level of social returns is endogenous to aggregate contributions. Interestingly, when comparing
a setting with multiple homogeneous public goods to an equivalent setting with a single
public good, they report greater contributions in the former than the latter, suggesting the
importance of framing. Bernasconi et al. (2009) also investigate this “unpacking” effect and
similarly find improvements in contribution levels in the unpacked case. Similar to the above
papers, Blackwell and McKee (2003) construct an environment with global and local public
goods. They find that when the two goods provide equal societal returns, subjects donate
more to the local public good; however, when social returns are higher for the global cause,
subjects give more to the global public good—in spite of it generating smaller private returns.
We build on this tradition by implementing an experiment with multiple public goods, but
we highlight a different aspect of the problem. Extending the design of Chan and Wolk (2020),
we eliminate the scope for coordination problems, thus allowing sharper focus on individual
allocations as the locus of inefficiency. In this way, our experiment more directly addresses
issues raised by effective altruists, who express concerns about individuals’ willingness to
allocate funds to inferior causes. Although our work bears similarities to Chan and Wolk
(2020), it is distinct. Whereas Chan and Wolk (2020) provide a proof-of-concept for this
experimental design and shed light on framing effects induced by the choice sets, we provide
deeper insight into policy relevant determinants of cost-ineffectiveness. We show how the
propensity for cost-(in)effective donations may be influenced by individual characteristics
and the broader information environment.
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Our findings on the provision of inferior public goods also shed light on the industrial
organization of charities. In particular, how do less efficient and less impactful charities
survive in the market? We find that warm-glow givers and impure altruists often spread their
contributions across causes, including inferior ones that might not otherwise survive under
effective altruism. This pattern of behavior can uphold otherwise unproductive charities, with
accompanying implications for efficiency of charity markets and social welfare.
Incorporating uncertainty has been a topic of interest in the public good games literature.
However, while a number of papers study risk in public good games (see, e.g., Dickinson
(1998), Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), Théroude and Zylbersztejn (2020)), few study am-
biguity. Levati and Morone (2013) and Björk et al. (2016) are among the few to examine
both risk and ambiguity, and they do not find significant differences in contribution behavior
in situations involving risky, ambiguous, or deterministic MPCRs for single public good set-
tings. According to the latter, there is also no interaction between strategic uncertainty and
natural uncertainty. They find that cooperative attitudes and beliefs about group members’
contributions are unaffected by natural uncertainty. Even so, focus has remained on settings
with single public goods, which does not allow for studying cost-effectiveness. Our work
thus provides novel insights into the interplay between cost-effectiveness and the overarching
information environment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical background
and hypotheses for our public good game. Section 3 outlines specific parameters used in
our experimental treatments and describes details of the experiment. We discuss results in
Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
Let there be n players and m public goods with prices normalized to unity. Following Chan
and Wolk (2020), each player i has budget wij to allocate to public good j: x
i
j ∈ [0, wij ].
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) of public good j is denoted γj . That is, player i’s
contribution to public good j, xij , produces a benefit of γj · xij to all players k = 1, . . . , n.




γj dFj and public goods be ordered such that γ̃1 < . . . < γ̃m. Finally, let the support
of γj be (γj , γj).
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)
dFm · · · dF1,
2To maintain focus on interesting cases in which there is a social dilemma, we constrain the support of each

















[wij − (1− γj) · xij + γj ·X−ij ]
)
dFm · · · dF1,
we see that both the effective cost 1− γj and the effective benefit γj are subject to risk.
How might cost-effectiveness of contributions vary across individuals? We first consider
risk attitudes. If a player is risk neutral, we derive the same condition as Chan and Wolk
(2020) for the cost-effective allocation of resources. That is, if xij > 0, then cost-effectiveness
requires that xi` = w
i
` for all ` > j. Clearly, this holds in an example where u
i(π) = π. In this











[wij − (1− γ̃j) · xij + γ̃j ·X−ij ].




` for all ` > j; otherwise, this player can
increase her utility by shifting resources from xij to x
i
`.
Alternatively, if player i is risk averse (e.g., ui(π) = πα with α ∈ (0, 1)), this is not obvious.
The reason is that payoffs may depend on player i’s beliefs about the contributions of others
(i.e., X−ij for all j = 1, . . . ,m). For instance, if i expects all others to contribute fully to
public good m (xkm = w
k
m) and nothing to the other public goods (x
k
j = 0 for j < m), player
i may decide to contribute a positive amount to public good m− 1 instead of m to mitigate
risk. However, this possibility only arises when γm and γm−1 have overlapping supports, so
that γm−1 may be realized at a higher value than γm. To rule out this possibility, we focus
on cases with non-overlapping supports.
Assumption 1. γ
`
> γj for all ` > j.




` for all ` > j.
This proposition states that individuals, regardless of risk or ambiguity attitudes, should
contribute in a cost-effective manner. That is, one should not contribute to a public good j
until exhausting all possibilities to contribute to higher-MPCR public goods ` > j.
We now consider the role of giving type. We consider four giving types as defined by
Gangadharan et al. (2018) and Gandullia et al. (2020): non-donors, pure altruists, warm-
glow givers, and impure altruists. The latter three types may contribute to public goods, but
for different reasons. Above, we assumed that players’ utilities are defined over total payoffs
to allow for more parsimonious exposition of risk types. Here, we consider richer preference
structures to elucidate differences across giving types.
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Such behavior would also be consistent with a preference for efficiency, and there is evidence
from prior public good experiments that (some) subjects behave in such a way (Goeree et al.,
2002).
However, there is also evidence from public good experiments of warm-glow givers who
instead derive utility from their own act of giving (Andreoni, 1993). These individuals may



































Impure altruists combine both warm-glow and altruistic motives. Importantly, these dif-
ferences in preference structures across giving types have implications for cost-(in)effective
giving. A pure altruist has no reason to contribute cost-ineffectively to the public good, as
doing so will reduce the total amount of the public good provided. On the other hand, a
warm-glow giver may contribute cost-ineffectively. If there are diminishing marginal warm
glow benefits for each specific public good in (2), then a warm-glow giver may spread their
contributions across public goods in a cost-ineffective manner. Indeed, this is an underlying
assumption of Null (2011). However, even a warm-glow giver who values total contributions
over all public goods could act similarly. In this case, contributions to m−1 and m are perfect
substitutes in (3), and the individual will be indifferent between contributing to one cause or
the other, which can beget a cost-ineffective allocation across causes.
As a result, we expect more cost-effective contributions among pure altruists and more
cost-ineffective contributions among warm-glow givers, with impure altruists falling between
these two poles. We summarize these insights in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Pure altruists will contribute in a cost-effective manner. Impure altruists
will contribute less cost-effectively than pure altruists, and warm-glow givers will contribute
even less cost-effectively than impure altruists.
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3 Experimental design
We conduct an experiment with n = 3 players and m = 4 public goods. For each public good,
players have an endowment of wij = 10 points available that they can contribute to public
good j. We implement three treatments with differing marginal per capita returns (MPCR),
γj , for each public good:
Treatment Certain. The values of the four MPCRs are certain:
γ1 = 0.475 γ2 = 0.625 γ3 = 0.775 γ4 = 0.925.
Treatment Risky. The values of the four MPCRs are subject to risk :
γ1 ∼ Un(0.40, 0.55) γ2 ∼ Un(0.55, 0.70) γ3 ∼ Un(0.70, 0.85) γ4 ∼ Un(0.85, 1.00).
Treatment Ambiguity. The values of the four MPCRs are subject to ambiguity :
γ1 ∈ (0.40, 0.55) γ2 ∈ (0.55, 0.70) γ3 ∈ (0.70, 0.85) γ4 ∈ (0.85, 1.00).
In all three treatments there is a clear ranking in the four MPCRs (γ4 > γ3 > γ2 > γ1).
Thus, our null hypothesis is that players’ contributions are cost-effective in all treatments
(regardless of their beliefs about the other two players’ choices).
On Tuesday 25 August 2020, we invited up to 216 potential participants (18–65 yrs, fluent
in English) via Prolific to participate in a “decision-making experiment”. In total, 201 partic-
ipants both accepted the consent form and completed all tasks. All these participants visited
all three treatments and completed four public good tasks in each treatment, but the order
in which they visited the three treatments was subject to individual randomization. After
completing the experimental treatments, subjects completed a sequence of short individual
tasks in which we elicited gender, age, giving type (Gangadharan et al., 2018; Gandullia et
al., 2020), risk attitude (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008), ambiguity attitude (Baillon et al.,
2018), attention level (Frederick, 2005; Sirota and Juanchich, 2018), and risk literacy (Cokely
et al., 2012). We offer brief descriptions of these tasks in the next section and provide full
details in Appendix A.
Groups were formed as soon as a triple of participants completed the full suite of tasks.
The three players within a group were paid according to the same randomly drawn treatment
(although players may have visited those treatments in a different sequence) and received
feedback on their final earnings.3 On average, participants earned £8.04 (£4.00 participation
3To compute the MPCRs for the Ambiguity treatment, we draw for each public good j two values aj and bj
from a uniform distribution, using the clocktime at which the first participant entered the group as the seed.
Next, for each public good j, the MPCR γj is the random draw from the β(aj , bj) distribution, scaled to the
respective MPCR interval.
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fee; £2.62 for the main treatment; £1.43 in the short individual tasks) for on average 23
minutes of their time.
Prior to data collection, ethical approval was obtained from Vrije University School of
Business and Economics Research Ethics Review Board (reference code SBE6/9/2020kwk350)
and University of Otago’s Human Ethics Committee (reference code D20/183). Moreover,
this study was pre-registered in advance on 18 August 2020 in the AEA RCT Registry under
the unique identifying number “AEARCTR-0006304”.
The experiment was programmed using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Screenshots are avail-
able in Appendix C.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Our post-experimental questionnaire included survey questions for basic demographic vari-
ables (gender and age) and a series of tasks to elicit each participant’s giving type, risk
attitude, ambiguity attitude, risk literacy, and attentiveness. We summarize these tasks here
briefly and provide additional details on each in the appendix.
For giving type, we use a two-stage charitable giving task, following the design of Gan-
gadharan et al. (2018) as implemented by Gandullia et al. (2020). Based on the donations
made in each stage of this task, we classify each participant as a non-donor, a pure warm-glow
donor, a pure altruist, or an impure altruist.4 To elicit risk attitudes, we use the lottery menu
described by Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008), and we use the method of Baillon et al. (2018)
to elicit ambiguity attitudes. We normalize both scales so that they range from 0 to 1, with
low values indicating risk/ambiguity aversion and high values indicating risk/ambiguity lov-
ing attitudes. Attentiveness was measured with a cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick,
2005) using the multiple choice format described by Sirota and Juanchich (2018). We use the
four questions from the Berlin Numeracy Test of Cokely et al. (2012) to measure risk literacy.
Both attentiveness and risk literacy are encoded as the fraction of correct answers given to
these survey questions.
Table 1 presents participant characteristics based on the post-experimental questionnaire.
We show statistics for each treatment sequence and for the full sample; as described above,
we use the following abbreviations: Certain (C), Risky (R), and Ambiguity (A). There are
no major differences across the different sequences.
We now turn to participant behavior in the experiment. Table 2 presents average con-
tribution levels across the four different public goods, by treatment environment, and by
sequence.




Seq N male female age none p.w-g p.alt i.alt risk amb crt r.lit
CRA 27 55.5% 44.4% 25.3 0.0% 11.1% 3.7% 85.2% 0.40 0.51 0.43 0.29
CAR 34 44.1% 55.9% 25.6 8.8% 17.6% 5.9% 67.6% 0.28 0.47 0.42 0.37
RCA 26 61.5% 38.5% 26.4 7.7% 19.2% 7.7% 65.4% 0.51 0.54 0.36 0.30
RAC 44 59.1% 40.9% 26.3 11.4% 15.9% 13.6% 59.9% 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.34
ACR 36 55.6% 44.4% 26.3 5.6% 13.9% 8.3% 72.2% 0.43 0.48 0.35 0.32
ARC 34 61.8% 39.2% 25.5 0.0% 14.7% 8.8% 76.5% 0.43 0.47 0.39 0.33
Total 201 56.2% 43.8% 25.9 6.0% 15.4% 8.5% 70.1% 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.33
Table 1: Participant characteristics. Treatment sequences use the following abbreviations: Certain
(C), Risky (R), and Ambiguity (A). Giving types are non-donors (none), pure warm-glow givers (p.w-
g), pure altruists (p.alt), and impure altruists (i.alt). The columns for risk, amb, crt, and r.lit provide
information on risk attitude, ambiguity attitude, attentiveness, and risk literacy, respectively.
Certain Risky Ambiguity
Seq PG 1 PG 2 PG 3 PG 4 PG 1 PG 2 PG 3 PG 4 PG 1 PG 2 PG 3 PG 4
CRA 4.74 5.26 6.37 6.78 5.15 5.41 5.85 7.00 4.85 5.52 5.63 6.67
CAR 4.18 4.79 5.68 7.12 3.79 4.82 5.62 7.15 4.12 4.65 5.79 7.12
RCA 4.54 4.88 5.46 6.35 3.58 4.04 4.62 6.15 4.46 4.50 5.23 6.42
RAC 3.07 4.00 5.20 6.82 2.93 3.75 5.07 6.57 2.86 3.89 5.16 6.59
ACR 4.25 5.06 6.33 7.08 4.00 4.94 6.06 7.17 4.14 5.19 6.14 7.61
ARC 3.59 3.94 4.97 6.35 3.62 4.15 5.09 5.94 3.35 4.06 4.97 6.21
Total 3.97 4.60 5.64 6.77 3.77 4.47 5.39 6.67 3.86 4.58 5.48 6.79
Table 2: Summary statistics for contribution levels.
Comparing across sequences, we find that participants who started with the risky public
goods contribute significantly less to the first three risky public goods and to the first two
ambiguous public goods compared to those who started with the certain public goods (p-
values from multivariate ANOVA tests: p = .009, p = .009, p = .099, p = .035, p = .052).
We find that those in the RCA and RAC sequences contribute significantly less in the risky
environment and in the ambiguous environment than those who started with the certain public
goods (p = .016, p = .094), indicating that there may be order effects. In subsequent analysis,
we will focus on between-subject comparisons based on participants’ contributions in their
first task to remove the impact of order effects.5 However, we note that our primary findings
continue to hold in within-subject analyses on the full sample, as described in Appendix B.
5The average response times for the first multiple public good games task that participants face are 102
(Certain), 106 (Risky) and 139 (Ambiguity) seconds. Although the response time for Ambiguity are substan-
tially above those for Certain and Risky, a Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality
across the three different first tasks (p = .166).
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4.2 Contribution behavior
Table 3 shows contribution behavior in the first task, with contributions for each public good
and total contributions by treatment. We find that subjects are responsive to MPCR, with
average contributions increasing in MPCR in all treatments (Wilcoxon tests result in p-values
below .001 for all three comparisons between consecutive PGs in all three treatments).
Treatment N PG 1 PG 2 PG 3 PG 4 Total
Certain 61 4.4262 5.0000 5.9836 6.9672 22.3771
Risky 70 3.1714 3.8571 4.9000 6.4143 18.3429
Ambiguity 70 3.7571 4.6429 5.5714 6.9286 20.9000
Table 3: Contributions across treatments.
What other factors influence contributions? At the institutional level, we find that contri-
butions vary by information environment. In particular, contributions are lower in Risky than
in Certain. We see this for total contributions (p = .016) and also for contributions to the first
three public goods (p = .007, p = .015, p = .028); contributions to PG 4 are not significantly
different for these two treatments (p = .238). Conclusions for the Ambiguity environment are
less clear-cut. Total contributions in Ambiguity lie between between Risky and Certain but
are statistically indistinguishable from either of these treatments (p > .11). For each public
good, contributions are not different between Certain and Ambiguity (p > .15), nor are they
different between Risky and Ambiguity (p = .082 for PG 2; p > .15 for the others).6
To analyze the role of individual characteristics, we regress total contributions on indi-
vidual characteristics and present the results in Table 4. Interestingly, we find that none of
the individual characteristics is predictive of total contributions. Perhaps most notable is
our result with respect to risk attitude, particularly because several of our treatments feature
consequential uncertainty. Yet, across treatments with and without uncertainty, we do not
find evidence that risk attitude is correlated with public good contributions. This null result
is consistent with Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), who find no correlation between risk aver-
sion and contributions to public goods. Our result stands in contrast to Jones and Rachlin
(2009) and Jing and Cheo (2013), who find that risk averse participants tend to contribute
less to public goods. We likewise do not find that ambiguity attitude or risk literacy are
predictive of public good contributions.
4.3 Cost-effectiveness
We have shown how total contributions differ across treatments. Might the cost-effectiveness
of those contributions also differ? We previously showed that contributions increase in MPCR.
However, individuals may still contribute in a cost-ineffective manner if they contribute posi-
6We use the convention of calling estimates significant when p < .05. However, we will provide explicit
p-values for all p ∈ (.05, .10) throughout for transparency.
12
Characteristic Certain Risky Ambiguity All
Constant 6.0576 23.2928∗∗∗ 25.5060∗∗∗ 19.2903∗∗∗
Gender 0.1138 0.2914 −2.4241 −1.0713
Age 0.2468 −0.1317 0.0372 0.0357
Giving type
pure warm-glow −0.8906 −3.7705 −5.9983 −3.2546
pure altruist 3.6746 −2.1545 −3.7749 −0.9453
impure altruist 4.1622 −0.5370 −6.0386 0.0207
Risk attitude 6.0955 1.6755 4.8083 2.2567
Ambiguity attitude −2.7803 −5.6125 −1.8393 −3.8123
Attention level (CRT) 7.1448∗∗ 1.0609 0.0284 2.3808
Risk literacy 8.7953 3.1361 0.7134 3.8909
Observations 60 70 68 198
Table 4: Total contributions. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those for which
questionnaire data is incomplete.
tive amounts to multiple public goods without exhausting contribution opportunities for the
highest MPCR ones. In this section we investigate individuals’ cost-(in)effectiveness in giving.














where wi` = 10 and m = 4 in our experiment. The minimum value for CI(x
i) is 0 (no
ineffectiveness) and the maximum is 40, obtained with the allocation (10, 10, 0, 0).
To understand the intuition behind this measure, consider the example CI(2, 8, 6, 8) = 10.
First, 2 units can be pushed from the third position to the fourth position. Then, 6 units
can be pushed from the second to the third. Lastly, 2 units can be pushed from the first to
second. In total, there are 10 pushes that can be made to increase payoffs without increasing
expenditures on public goods, resulting in the cost-effective allocation (0,4,10,10). As a second
example, CI(2, 3, 4, 2) = 15. First, 4 units can be pushed from third to fourth. Second, 3
units can be pushed from second to third, and those 3 units can in turn be pushed from third
to fourth. Third, 2 units can be pushed from first to second and from second to third, after
which 1 of these can be pushed from third to fourth. In total, there are 15 pushes to arrive
at the cost-effective allocation (0,0,1,10).
The maximum possible CI is 0 for someone who does not contribute at all (non-contributors),
and also 0 for someone who contributes everything (full-contributors). Hence, only partial
contributors can be cost-ineffective. To correct for this we develop a measure of relative
cost-ineffectiveness.




j in total. The maximum cost-ineffectiveness
is obtained by this amount being contributed to the least effective public goods. This is the


















Now, we can define relative cost-ineffectiveness as





This measure is undefined for individuals who cannot contribute cost-ineffectively, i.e., non-
contributors and full-contributors. For the two examples above, we obtain RCI(2, 8, 6, 8) =
10/36 = 0.2778 and RCI(2, 3, 4, 2) = 15/31 = 0.4839.7 This measure is attractive because it
conditions on the total amount contributed, which is endogenous, thus allowing for comparison
across subjects.
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distributions of RCI for the three treatments. There are
no significant differences across treatments (p > .35). Thus, the information environment































Figure 1: Relative cost ineffectiveness.
We now turn to the role of individual characteristics. Table 5 presents regression results
relating RCI to individual characteristics. The most interesting finding is for giving type, for
which non-givers are the reference category. Our regression results suggest that warm-glow
givers (as assessed by our separate charitable donation task) are more inclined toward cost-
ineffective contributions than non-givers. This effect is most pronounced under Ambiguity,
although it is also observable for Risky; we find no such differences in the Certain environment.
Impure altruists also contribute in a more cost-ineffective manner than non-givers, but this
appears to be driven primarily by behavior in the Ambiguity environment. Thus, although
individual characteristics are not predictive of total contributions, as described above, the
participant’s giving type does influence the cost-effectiveness of contributions. These findings
are robust for within- and between-subjects analyses, and they are also robust to alternative
7Although these two individuals have the same ranking for both CI and RCI, this need not be the case in
general. For example, imagine a third individual with (1, 1, 0, 0). This individual has a lower CI (5) than the
other two individuals, but a higher RCI (0.8000).
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classifications rules for giving type. Full descriptions and results for these robustness checks
are provided in Appendix B.
Characteristic Certain Risky Ambiguity All
Constant 0.2891∗∗ 0.2035∗ 0.1213 0.2065∗∗∗
Gender −0.0337 −0.0027 −0.0510 −0.0309
Age 0.0014 −0.0004 0.0012 0.0008
Giving type
pure warm-glow 0.1110 0.1485∗ 0.2135∗ 0.1371∗∗∗
pure altruist −0.0173 0.1443 0.1217 0.0847
impure altruist 0.0746 0.1023 0.2241∗∗ 0.1182∗∗∗
Risk attitude −0.0324 −0.1015 −0.0269 −0.0588∗
Ambiguity attitude −0.0032 0.1707∗∗ −0.0141 0.0746
Attention level (CRT) −0.0570 −0.0121 −0.0403 −0.0378
Risk literacy −0.0048 −0.0092 0.0762 0.0267
Observations 54 67 64 185
Table 5: Relative cost ineffectiveness. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those that
do not contribute to any public good and those that contribute fully to every public good, or other
questionnaire data is missing.
These differences can be visualized in Figure 2. We see that there is greater density at
low RCI values for non-donors and pure altruists, while for warm-glow givers and impure
altruists there is greater density at high RCI values. Average RCI for each giving type is
0.1965 (non-donors), 0.3305 (warm-glow givers), 0.2901 (pure altruists), and 0.3417 (impure
altruists). Compared to non-donors, RCI is higher among warm-glow givers (difference is
0.1340; p = .007) and impure altruists (difference is 0.1452; p = .001). Otherwise, there are
































Figure 2: Relative cost ineffectiveness and giving type.
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results indicate that the information environment can affect overall contribution be-
havior, with lower contributions in the Risky setting, but we find little evidence that this
institutional factor affects cost-effectiveness of contributions. However, the reverse is true for
individual characteristics. Here, we find that individual characteristics have little bearing on
total contributions, but that giving type can influence cost-effectiveness. In particular, we
find that warm-glow givers and impure altruists are more likely to contribute cost-ineffectively
than non-givers.
This latter finding can be rationalized with theory and is consistent with common wisdom
concerning warm-glow motives. Indeed, previous literature assumes warm-glow givers are
more likely to donate inefficiently than are pure altruists (see, e.g., Null (2011) and Singer
(2015)), yet we are not aware of any prior work that directly tests this relationship. Against
this backdrop, our results are novel and provide important empirical backing for this com-
monly held claim. In addition to documenting differences in cost-effectiveness across giving
types, we furthermore show that these differences are most pronounced in settings where there
may be risk or ambiguity surrounding the value of public good contributions.
More broadly, our experimental work elucidates key factors underlying—or undermining—
effective altruism. We shed new light on how the cost-effectiveness of public good provision
efforts is influenced by individual characteristics in general and giving types in particular.
Moving beyond the individual, we furthermore demonstrate how the information environment
can affect the propensity to give. Our results have direct implications for real-world settings,
as they suggest that strategies for mitigating uncertainty in the value or efficacy of public
goods can help stimulate provision by private actors. Our inquiry into environments with
multiple public goods is especially germane given expanding options for public good provision
through traditional charities and emerging crowdfunding and patronage platforms.
We can imagine several avenues for future research. First, our theoretical exposition sug-
gests that those with warm-glow motives are more likely to contribute in a cost-ineffective
manner. Indeed, we find evidence of this in our experiment, but it is possible that there are
other factors that correlate with giving type that drive these between-treatment differences.
For example, different giving types may also have different norms or beliefs about how one
should allocate resources across different charitable causes. Exploring these possibilities will
provide a better understanding of whether giving type, per se, is responsible for our experi-
mental results. A second interesting line of inquiry is to vary whom the individual interacts
with in the different public goods. In our experiment, a subject interacts with the same set
of group members across all four public goods, but in real-world settings, it is more likely
that they will interact with different individuals or networks in each (Bramoullé and Kranton,
2007; Richefort, 2018). Third, there is a need for further inquiry into how giving types are
characterized and whether these differ across contexts. In our experiment, we have elicited
16
giving types using a charitable giving task, and we have found that these giving types are
correlated with different patterns of behavior in a public good game. Whether giving types
are necessarily consistent across these settings remains an open question.
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A Short individual tasks: Description and summary statistics
Giving type
We use the design of Gangadharan et al. (2018) as implemented by Gandullia et al. (2020).
Participants are given 20 points and have to decide how many (if any) of these points, g1,
they want to donate to their preferred charity (out of Oxfam, Red Cross, Save the Children,
World Wildlife Fund, and Doctors without Borders), knowing that any amount not donated
by them will be donated by us (the experimenters), such that the charity organization will
always receive a total donation of 20 points. After they have made this decision, they are
informed that they have 20 − g1 points left, and are given the opportunity to donate any
amount, g2, of these to the charity, knowing that this time no further donation will be made















Figure 3: Giving type.
Figure 3 illustrates the choices of the participants, where the volume of the bubbles are
proportional to the number of participants making a particular choice. We use the values g1
and g2 to determine a participant’s giving type as follows:
g1 g2 giving type
= 0 = 0 non-donor or pure selfish
> 0 = 0 pure warm-glow giver
= 0 > 0 pure altruist
> 0 > 0 impure altruist
The experiments of Gandullia et al. (2020) were conducted via MTurk with 1,062 individ-
uals participating. The resulting distribution over the four giving types was 33%, 20%, 8%
and 39% in their study. The distribution resulting from our experiment is 6%, 15%, 8% and
70%. That is, substantially less non-donors and substantially more impure altruists. In our
analysis, we use giving type as a categorical variable.
In Appendix B, we consider different thresholds for classifying giving types. Our primary
findings are robust to such variations.
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Risk attitude
We follow the method introduced by Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) and ask participants
to choose which lottery they want to play out of a menu of lotteries. All lotteries on the
menu yield a high payoff, πH , or a low payoff, πL, each with a 50–50 chance, but the values
of the high and the low payoff differ across lotteries. In order to obtain more variation in the
data, participants in our experiment are given the following menu of 11 lotteries (A–K), and
associated CRRA intervals:
lottery A B C D E F G H I J K
πH 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
πL 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
CRRA min 4.91 1.64 1.00 0.72 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.24 0.16 –
max – 4.91 1.64 1.00 0.72 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.24 0.16
Figure 4 illustrates the choices participants made. In our analysis we take risk as a linear
variable and assign the value 0 to the most risk-averse choice (lottery A) and the value 1 to




A B C D E F G H I J K
Figure 4: Risk attitude.
Ambiguity attitude
We use the method of Baillon et al. (2018). An urn is filled with red, green and blue balls.8
Via a stochastic BDM we elicit reservation prices mr, mg and mb for the option on winning
(20 points) by drawing a ball of one particular color, and reservation prices m−r, m−g and
m−b for the option on winning (20 points) by drawing a ball of one out of two possible
colors. Take m1 =
1
3(mr + mg + mb) and m2 =
1
3(m−r + m−g + m−b). Now, a = 1− (m1 +
m2) ∈ [−1, 1] measures ambiguity attitude. In order to prevent issues related to curvature of
utility functions over points, reservation prices are implemented as probabilities to win the
20 points. In order to keep the experiment within time limits, participants are asked to state
the reservation for one one-color option and for one two-color option; the exact colors are
8We use a method similar to that described in Footnote 3 to design the ambiguous urn.
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randomly drawn at the individual level, but always such that for each participant the two
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Figure 5: Ambiguity attitude. Left: scatter plot of participants’choices (m1,m2); right: distribution
of m1 +m2.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows the participants’ choices for m1 and m2. The average
value of m1 and m2 are 45.86 and 57.04. While the average value of m1 is above the ambiguity
neutral value of 1/3, the average value of m2 is below the ambiguity neutral value of 2/3.
Although one-third of the participants reported a value of m2 below that of m1, overall the
values for m2 are significantly above those of m1 (Wilcoxon: p = .000). Further, the reported
values of m1 and m2 correlate significantly (Spearman: ρ = 0.300, p = .000).
The right panel of the figure shows the distribution of m1 + m2 that we use to evaluate
individuals’ ambiguity attitude. Values of m1 + m2 above 100 indicate ambiguity aversion
and those below 100 ambiguity loving. The average value of m1 + m2 = 102.90 indicates
slight ambiguity aversion on average. There are 70 participants (34.82%) with m1 +m2 < 96,
34 (16.92%) with m1 +m2 ∈ [96, 104], and 97 (48.26%) with m1 +m2 > 104. In our analysis
we encode ambiguity attitude by 1 − m1+m2200 , such that extreme ambiguity-aversion is at 0,
ambiguity-neutral is at 1/2 and extreme ambiguity-loving is at 1.
Attention level and risk literacy
To elicit the participants’ attention level we use the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick
(2005), where we follow Sirota and Juanchich (2018) in having participants choose from
four possible answers—one of the wrong answers being the intuitive one and one being the
correct one. Participants are given 90 seconds to answer the three questions. The percentage
of correct answers for the three questions were 38%, 49% and 51%, while the percentage
of intuitive answers for each of the three questions were 60%, 37% and 39% inSirota and
Juanchich (2018). The respective percentages for our participants are 40%, 49% and 41% for
correct answers and 54%, 35% and 38% for intuitive answers—not too different from Sirota
and Juanchich (2018). The distribution of participants over the number of correctly answered
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questions is presented in Figure 6. In our analysis, we incorporate attention level as a linear
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Figure 6: Attention level (left) and risk literacy (right)
We use the four multiple-choice questions from the Berlin Numeracy Test of Cokely et
al. (2012) to elicit participants’ risk literacy. Participants are given 150 seconds to answer
the four questions. The distribution of participants over the number of correctly answered
questions is presented in Figure 6. The four individual questions were answered correctly
in 54%, 44%, 25%, and 14% of the cases, respectively. In our analysis we incorporate risk
literacy as a linear variable encoded via the fraction of correct answers given.
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B Robustness
Our primary analysis reveals (i) no correlation between individual characteristics and contri-
bution levels and (ii) a strong relationship between giving type and cost-ineffectiveness. Here,
we conduct a series of additional analyses demonstrating the robustness of these results.
B.1 Within-subjects analysis
We restricted our primary analysis to between-subject comparisons based on the first treat-
ment encountered by each subject. This restriction allowed for clean comparisons uncon-
founded by order effects. We begin by investigating whether our results hold when analyzing
the full sample, inclusive of all treatments.
B.1.1 Contribution behavior
Table 6 is the full-sample analog of Table 3, as it presents average amounts contributed to the
different public goods and in total for the different treatments. Contributions across public
goods are increasing for all treatments (Wilcoxon tests result in p-values below .001 for all
three comparisons between consecutive PGs in all three treatments). There are no significant
differences in total contributions across treatments (C vs. R: p = .083; C vs. A: p = .768; R
vs. A: p = .276). For the individual public goods there are no significant differences between
Ambiguity and the other treatments (p > .23), but there are between Certain and Risky
(PG1: p = .042; PG2: p = .549; PG3: p = .508; PG4: p = .899).
Treatment N PG 1 PG 2 PG 3 PG 4 Total
Certain 201 3.9701 4.5970 5.6368 6.7711 20.9751
Risky 201 3.7662 4.4726 5.3881 6.6716 20.2985
Ambiguity 201 3.8607 4.5771 5.4826 6.7861 20.7065
Table 6: Contributions across treatments.
Table 7 presents regression results for the relationship between individual characteristics
and total contributions for each treatment. Here, we see that none of the individual charac-
teristics elicited in the questionnaire are predictive of total contributions in any of the three
treatments, consistent with our findings presented in Table 4.
B.1.2 Cost-effectiveness
Turning to our measure of cost-ineffectiveness, we also find consistent results between our
primary analysis and the full-sample analysis. First, we observe that subjects’ RCI is not
significantly different across treatments (pairwise Wilcoxon tests: p > .60).
Table 8 presents regression results revealing that some individual characteristics are pre-
dictive of cost-ineffective contribution behavior, with giving type standing out. In particular,
pure warm-glow givers and impure altruists tend to have higher RCI, consistent with our
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Characteristic Certain Risky Ambiguity
Constant 18.0465∗∗∗ 18.7050∗∗∗ 18.5333∗∗∗
Gender −1.0674 0.2156 0.0608
Age −0.0571 −0.0303 −0.0019
Giving type
pure warm-glow 0.5450 −2.9193 −1.3420
pure altruist 0.5264 −1.6633 −2.3787
impure altruist 2.4043 −0.0240 −0.1406
Risk attitude 1.4995 1.6895 2.3911
Ambiguity attitude −1.1956 −3.6911 −2.5452
Attention level (CRT) 3.0917 2.7565 1.7799
Risk literacy 4.0705 3.0337 2.6047
Observations 198 198 198
Table 7: Total contributions. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those for which
questionnaire data is incomplete.
primary findings reported in Table 5. However, unlike in Table 5, we also find that pure
altruists have higher RCI in the full sample analysis, although the point estimates remain
smaller than for pure warm-glow givers and impure altruists.
Characteristic Certain Risky Ambiguity
Constant 0.2598∗∗∗ 0.1691∗∗ 0.1642∗∗
Gender −0.0294 −0.0197 −0.0209
Age 0.0009 0.0024 0.0020
Giving type
pure warm-glow 0.1141∗∗ 0.1400∗∗ 0.1794∗∗∗
pure altruist 0.0500 0.1073∗ 0.1181∗∗
impure altruist 0.0832 0.1514∗∗∗ 0.1811∗∗∗
Risk attitude −0.0091 0.0003 −0.0612∗
Ambiguity attitude 0.0201 0.0301 0.0206
Attention level (CRT) −0.0745∗∗ −0.0853∗∗∗ −0.0393
Risk literacy 0.0581 0.0407 0.0101
Observations 185 188 187
Table 8: Relative cost ineffectiveness. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those that
do not contribute to any public good and those that contribute fully to every public good, or other
questionnaire data is missing.
B.2 Giving type classification
As discussed in Appendix A, our primary analyses classify subjects into giving types based on
the design of Gangadharan et al. (2018). That is, in a separate elicitation, subjects are asked
to give g1 and g2 in consecutive charitable giving tasks. Then, using the implementation of
Gandullia et al. (2020), we classify subjects into giving types according to the rules outlined
in the table below. Using these rules, the sample for our main analysis is composed of 6%,
15%, 8% and 70%, respectively, of each giving type.
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g1 g2 giving type
= 0 = 0 non-donor or pure selfish
> 0 = 0 pure warm-glow giver
= 0 > 0 pure altruist
> 0 > 0 impure altruist
However, one may be concerned that any choice of thresholds entails some arbitrariness.
One may furthermore worry that our particular thresholds may misclassify pure selfish types,
as the thresholds at zero establish a low bar for ascribing prosocial intentions. Therefore,
probing the robustness of our results to alternative classification schemes is critical, espe-
cially given the prominence of giving type in our findings. In what follows, we (i) vary the
thresholds for giving type classifications and (ii) consider a coarser classification that pools
all subjects with warm-glow motives. Both variations change our distribution of giving types
in a predictable manner, and our main findings remain unchanged under these different clas-
sifications.
We begin by considering the following thresholds for giving type:
g1 g2 g1 + g2 giving type
– – ≤ 2 non-donor or pure selfish
– ≤ 1 > 2 pure warm-glow giver
≤ 1 – > 2 pure altruist
> 1 > 1 – impure altruist
These thresholds increase the likelihood that a subject will be classified as a non-donor
or pure selfish type, while decreasing the likelihood that one will be classified as an impure
altruist. The following table gives the resulting distribution over types, their average total
contributions, and relative cost-ineffectiveness:
giving type N X RCI
non-donor 8 19.69 0.2187
pure warm-glow 18 19.75 0.3502
pure altruist 9 20.94 0.2848
impure altruist 65 20.68 0.3399
The overall distribution of giving types remains quite similar to before, with 8%, 18%, 9%,
and 65%, respectively, of each type. There is a slight increase in the proportion of non-donors
and slight decrease in the proportion of impure altruists under this classification, as predicted.
Our primary findings are unchanged by this alternative classification. There are no sig-
nificant differences in total contributions across the different giving types (Mann-Whitney:
p > .52). Pure warm-glow givers and impure altruists contribute more cost-ineffectively than
non-donors (p < .01), and there are no significant differences across the other categories
(p > .16).
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Table 9 shows that, using this alternative classification for giving type, individual charac-
teristics are still not predictive of total contributions, and giving type remains highly predic-






pure warm-glow −0.4986 0.1410∗∗∗
pure altruist 0.4387 0.0720
impure altruist 2.0456 0.1035∗∗∗
Risk attitude 2.0673 −0.0681∗∗
Ambiguity attitude −3.6289 0.0775∗
Attention level (CRT) 2.5509 −0.0393
Risk literacy 3.9955 0.0314
Observations 198 185
Table 9: Relative cost ineffectiveness. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those that
do not contribute to any public good and those that contribute fully to every public good, or other
questionnaire data is missing.
Next, we consider another classification scheme. Here, we create a dummy variable Dw-g
with Dw-g = 1 if g1 > 2 and 0 otherwise. We consider subjects with value Dw-g = 1 to
have a strong warm-glow motive, thus pooling pure warm-glow givers and impure altruists
into a single group. This table gives the resulting distribution over types, their average total
contributions, and relative cost-ineffectiveness:
Dw-g N X RCI
0 41 19.24 0.2754
1 160 20.77 0.3406
There are no significant differences in total contributions across the two types (p = .451),
but they differ significantly in cost-effectiveness (p = .015).
Table 10 shows that, using this binary classification of warm-glow motives, individual
characteristics are still not predictive of total contributions, and giving type remains highly








Risk attitude 1.8376 −0.0681∗∗
Ambiguity attitude −2.7748 0.0713
Attention level (CRT) 2.4912 −0.0365
Risk literacy 4.1970 0.0262
Observations 198 185
Table 10: Relative cost ineffectiveness. ∗ 10%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%. Observations do not include those that
do not contribute to any public good and those that contribute fully to every public good, or other
questionnaire data is missing.
29
C Screenshots




















C.3.5 Attention level and risk literacy
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C.4 Waiting and feedback screens
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